This statement articulates a fundamental principle in the law of defamation concerning the element of 'reference to the plaintiff'. For a statement to be defamatory, it must not only be defamatory in nature and published, but it must also be understood by reasonable people to refer to the plaintiff. The crucial point highlighted is that the defendant's subjective intention or knowledge regarding the plaintiff's identity is largely irrelevant.

Elucidation of the Principle:

The law of defamation primarily protects an individual's reputation. The harm caused by a defamatory statement is to the plaintiff's standing in the eyes of others. This harm occurs regardless of whether the defendant intended to defame that specific person or even knew of their existence. The test is objective: would a reasonable person, acquainted with the plaintiff, understand the words to refer to them?

This principle means that a defendant cannot escape liability by claiming:

1. Lack of Intention: They did not intend to defame the plaintiff.
2. Lack of Knowledge: They did not know the plaintiff existed.
3. Fictional Character Defense: They believed they were writing about a fictional character, but that character coincidentally resembled a real person.
4. Mistake: They made a mistake in identifying the person.

If the words, when read by someone who knows the plaintiff, would reasonably lead them to believe that the plaintiff is the person being defamed, then the element of 'reference to the plaintiff' is satisfied. The focus is on the impact of the words on the plaintiff's reputation, not the defendant's state of mind.

Case Law:

1. Hulton & Co. v. Jones (1910): This is the seminal case establishing this principle. A newspaper published a fictional article describing the immoral activities of a character named 'Artemus Jones' at a motor festival. Unbeknownst to the newspaper, there was a real barrister named Artemus Jones, who was known to many readers. Several people who knew the real Artemus Jones believed the article referred to him. The House of Lords held the newspaper liable for defamation, ruling that it was immaterial that the defendants did not intend to refer to the plaintiff or even know of his existence. The test was whether reasonable people who knew the plaintiff would understand the words to refer to him.

2. Newstead v. London Express Newspaper Ltd. (1940): A newspaper published an article stating that 'Harold Newstead, a Camberwell man,' had been convicted of bigamy. There were two men named Harold Newstead in Camberwell. The innocent Harold Newstead sued for defamation. The Court of Appeal, following Hulton v. Jones, held the newspaper liable. Even though the statement was true about one Harold Newstead, it was defamatory and false about the other, and reasonable people could have understood it to refer to the innocent plaintiff.

These cases clearly demonstrate that the defendant publishes defamatory material at their own risk. They have a duty to ensure that their statements do not, even inadvertently, refer to and defame an identifiable individual. The law prioritizes the protection of an individual's reputation over the defendant's lack of malicious intent or knowledge.

In conclusion, the principle that the defendant's intention or knowledge is immaterial for establishing reference to the plaintiff is a cornerstone of defamation law. It ensures that individuals are protected from reputational harm caused by statements that, though perhaps unintentionally, are reasonably understood by others to refer to them, thereby upholding the objective nature of the tort of defamation.