This statement delves into a critical aspect of contract law concerning 'mistake of identity,' particularly in cases involving fraud. It correctly distinguishes between a mistake regarding the identity of the contracting party and a mistake regarding their attributes or a fictitious identity. The core principle is that for a contract to be void ab initio due to a mistake of identity, the plaintiff must have intended to contract with a specific, existing person, and not merely with the person physically present.

Mistake of Identity vs. Mistake as to Attributes:

In contract law, a mistake can render a contract void or voidable. A 'mistake of identity' is a fundamental mistake that goes to the root of the contract, making it void ab initio (from the beginning). This means no contract ever came into existence. This typically occurs when one party intends to contract with a specific person, but by mistake, contracts with someone else.

In contrast, a 'mistake as to attributes' (e.g., creditworthiness, wealth, or reputation) of the person with whom one is contracting does not generally make the contract void. If the plaintiff intends to contract with the person physically present, even if that person has misrepresented their attributes, the contract is merely voidable for misrepresentation or fraud, not void for mistake of identity. A voidable contract remains valid until rescinded by the innocent party, and a third party acquiring goods in good faith before rescission can obtain good title.

Conditions for Mistake of Identity (as per the statement):

The statement outlines two crucial conditions for a mistake of identity to arise:

1. Existence of a Specific Person in Plaintiff's Knowledge: The plaintiff must have a particular, identifiable person in mind with whom they intend to contract. This person must actually exist.
2. Intention to Deal with That Specific Person Only: The plaintiff's intention must be to contract exclusively with that specific person, and not with anyone else, including the person physically present or communicating with them.

If the Name Assumed by the Swindler is Fictitious:

The statement asserts that 'If the name assumed by the swindler is fictitious, there will be no mistake of identity.' This is a crucial point. If the swindler assumes a completely fictitious name, there is no existing person with that identity in the plaintiff's mind. Therefore, the plaintiff cannot claim to have intended to contract with a non-existent entity. In such cases, the plaintiff is deemed to have contracted with the person physically present or communicating, even if that person is a fraudster. The contract would then be voidable for fraud, not void for mistake of identity.

Leading Case Law Examination:

1. Cundy v. Lindsay (1878) (Mistake of Identity - Void):

   • Facts: A rogue named Blenkarn ordered handkerchiefs from Lindsay & Co., signing his name to resemble 'Blenkiron & Co.', a reputable firm known to Lindsay. Lindsay & Co. believed they were dealing with Blenkiron & Co. and sent the goods. Blenkarn then sold the goods to Cundy, an innocent third party.
   • Held: The House of Lords held that the contract between Lindsay & Co. and Blenkarn was void for mistake of identity. Lindsay & Co. intended to contract only with Blenkiron & Co., a specific existing entity, and not with Blenkarn. Since no contract came into existence, Blenkarn acquired no title to the goods, and therefore could pass no title to Cundy. Cundy had to return the goods to Lindsay & Co.
   • Relevance: This case strongly supports the statement's first condition: the plaintiff intended to deal with a specific, existing person (Blenkiron & Co.) and not the rogue.

2. Ingram v. Little (1961) (Mistake of Identity - Void, but controversial):

   • Facts: Three sisters advertised their car for sale. A rogue, purporting to be 'P.G.M. Hutchinson,' a reputable businessman from a specific address, offered to buy it with a cheque. The sisters checked the name and address in a directory, confirmed 'Hutchinson' existed, and then accepted the cheque. The cheque bounced, and the rogue sold the car to Little, an innocent third party.
   • Held: The majority of the Court of Appeal held the contract between the sisters and the rogue was void for mistake of identity. The sisters intended to contract only with the real 'Hutchinson' and not the rogue present before them.
   • Relevance: This case, though criticized for its fine distinction, reinforces the idea that if the plaintiff's intention is solely to contract with a specific, known individual, a mistake as to the identity of the person physically present can render the contract void.

3. Phillips v. Brooks Ltd. (1919) (Mistake as to Attributes - Voidable):

   • Facts: A rogue, Mr. North, entered Phillips' jewellery shop and selected pearls and a ring. He claimed to be 'Sir George Bullough,' a well-known wealthy individual, and wrote a cheque. Phillips allowed him to take the ring before the cheque cleared. The cheque bounced, and North pledged the ring to Brooks Ltd., an innocent pawnbroker.
   • Held: The court held that the contract between Phillips and North was not void for mistake of identity, but merely voidable for fraud. Phillips intended to contract with the person physically present in his shop, even though he was mistaken about that person's attributes (his true identity and creditworthiness). Since the contract was voidable, North acquired a voidable title, which he passed to Brooks Ltd. before Phillips rescinded the contract. Brooks Ltd. therefore acquired good title.
   • Relevance: This case illustrates the 'presumption of contracting with the person present' in face-to-face dealings. It supports the idea that if the plaintiff does not have a specific, existing person in mind other than the one present, there is no mistake of identity.

4. Lake v. Simmons (1927) (Fictitious Identity - No Mistake of Identity):

   • Facts: A woman, by falsely representing herself as the wife of a well-known person, obtained two pearl necklaces from a jeweller on approval. She intended to steal them. The jeweller sued his insurers, who argued that the loss was not covered because the goods were entrusted to the woman as a customer.
   • Held: The House of Lords held that the jeweller intended to contract with the woman physically present, even though he was mistaken about her marital status and identity. The contract was voidable for fraud, not void for mistake of identity. The woman was a 'customer' in the sense that the jeweller dealt with her, albeit fraudulently. The case implicitly supports the idea that if the identity assumed is fictitious or merely a misrepresentation of attributes, the contract is not void for mistake of identity.

Conclusion:

The statement accurately reflects the nuanced legal position on mistake of identity. For a contract to be void due to a mistake of identity, the plaintiff must demonstrate a clear intention to contract with a specific, existing third party, and not with the rogue physically present. If the rogue assumes a fictitious name, there is no existing person with that identity for the plaintiff to have intended to contract with. In such scenarios, the contract is generally considered voidable for fraud, as the plaintiff is deemed to have contracted with the person before them, albeit under a misapprehension about their attributes. The distinction is crucial because it determines whether a third party who subsequently acquires the goods in good faith obtains good title (voidable contract) or no title at all (void contract).