The statement raises a fundamental constitutional challenge to Section 124A of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), which defines sedition. This challenge centers on the tension between the right to freedom of speech and expression guaranteed by Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution and the state's power to impose reasonable restrictions under Article 19(2).

Historically, sedition laws, inherited from colonial rule, were indeed used to suppress dissent and criticism against the government. The original wording of Section 124A, which criminalized exciting 'disaffection' towards the government, was broad enough to potentially punish mere 'bad feelings' or criticism, even without any incitement to violence or public disorder. This broad interpretation was seen as an unreasonable restriction on free speech.

However, the constitutional validity of Section 124A was definitively addressed by the Supreme Court of India in the landmark case of Kedarnath Singh v. State of Bihar (1962). The Court acknowledged the potential for misuse of the provision but upheld its constitutionality by giving it a narrow and specific interpretation. The Court held that:

1. Sedition is constitutional, but its application is limited: Section 124A is constitutional only if the words, spoken or written, have the tendency or intention to incite violence or public disorder. Mere criticism of the government, however strong or harsh, or expressing 'bad feelings' or 'disaffection' without any incitement to violence, is not sedition.
2. Distinction between 'disaffection' and 'incitement to violence': The Court clarified that 'disaffection' in Section 124A must be interpreted in a manner that includes disloyalty and feelings of enmity, but crucially, these feelings must manifest in acts that have a tendency to create public disorder or incite violence. It distinguished between 'disloyalty to the government established by law' and 'disapprobation of the measures of the government'. Only the former, when coupled with incitement to violence, would fall within the ambit of sedition.
3. Saved by Article 19(2): The Court held that sedition, when interpreted narrowly to mean acts that incite violence or public disorder, falls within the permissible restrictions on free speech under Article 19(2) in the interest of 'public order'.

Therefore, the statement that Section 124A is ultra-vires if it punishes merely 'bad feelings' against the government reflects a valid concern that was addressed by the Supreme Court's interpretation in Kedarnath Singh. The Court effectively read down the provision to align it with constitutional guarantees. While the law itself remains on the statute book, its application is strictly limited to instances where there is an actual or intended incitement to violence or public disorder. Any prosecution under Section 124A for mere criticism or expression of 'bad feelings' without such incitement would be unconstitutional and liable to be quashed.

Despite the Kedarnath Singh judgment, Section 124A continues to be a subject of debate and legal challenges, with arguments that its very existence has a chilling effect on free speech and that its broad language, even with the judicial gloss, can still be misused. However, as per the current legal position established by the Supreme Court, the provision is constitutional, provided its application adheres strictly to the principles laid down in Kedarnath Singh.