India's nuclear policy is characterized by its commitment to 'No First Use' (NFU) and 'Credible Minimum Deterrence' (CMD), a stance that evolved significantly after its 1998 nuclear tests (Pokhran II). The NFU doctrine states that India will not be the first to use nuclear weapons against any country, but reserves the right to retaliate massively if attacked with nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons. This policy aims to project India as a responsible nuclear power, committed to global disarmament while ensuring its security.

The CMD principle implies maintaining a sufficient, but not excessive, nuclear arsenal and delivery systems to inflict unacceptable damage on an adversary, thereby deterring a first strike. This includes a triad of land, air, and sea-based nuclear capabilities. India's policy also emphasizes strict civilian control over nuclear weapons and a moratorium on further nuclear testing.

Critically, the NFU doctrine faces challenges regarding its credibility, especially in scenarios involving conventional asymmetry with adversaries like Pakistan, which has a 'first use' option. Some strategists argue that NFU might limit India's options in a conventional war, potentially inviting a nuclear threat. The 'massive retaliation' clause also raises questions about proportionality and escalation control. Furthermore, the definition of 'credible minimum' is dynamic and subject to regional security environments, potentially leading to an arms race. India's refusal to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as a non-nuclear weapon state, while advocating for universal disarmament, has also drawn criticism, though India maintains its non-proliferation credentials through responsible behavior and export controls. Despite these criticisms, India's nuclear policy has largely succeeded in providing strategic stability in the region and projecting India as a mature nuclear power, balancing security imperatives with global non-proliferation norms.